We study the possibility of peace when two countries fight a war over the ownership of a resource. War is always the outcome of the game played by rational countries -under complete or asymmetric information-when there is no pre-established distribution of the resource among countries.
Introduction
Rationalist theories explain war as the rational choice of countries (see Hirshleifer (1991) , Skaperdas (2002) and surveys by Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) and Jackson and Morelli (2011) ). This approach shows how factors such as trade, long-term relationships, political bias and the distribution of resources amplify or e↵ace the incentives for war (see Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996) , In this paper, we consider a conflict arising between two countries for the control of a resource. Our emphasis will be on the e↵ects of asymmetric information and the distribution of the resource prior to the conflict. To address the second issue, we consider two setups: the Undistributed Resource Game (UR), where countries have no prior ownership of the resource, and the Fully Distributed Resource Game (FDR), where there is a pre-existing distribution of the resource. 1 A forerunner of this approach is Clausewitz (1832, Chapter 1), who noted that "War is akin to a card game".
2 For a recent application of mediation to war, see Horner, Morelli and Squintani (2011).
We first study complete information which serves us as a benchmark case. For UR, war is the only equilibrium outcome. The explanation is that since peace yields the status quo, i.e., zero payo↵ outcome, a rational country always prefers conflict. For FDR, we show that there is a set of divisions of the resource such that, in equilibrium, both countries will choose peace. The reason is that the status quo for each country is her share of the resource. The possibility of losing this share makes countries reluctant to go to war.
Next, we consider asymmetric information. We assume that country one has private information on how valuable the resource is for her and may have a high or a low valuation (type) of the resource at stake. Country two has only a prior probability that country one is of the high or low type. As an illustration, think that country one has done research on the existence of a valuable resource in a territory under dispute and the results of this research are in the hands of this country only. Also, a country might be uncertain about the willingness of the other country to fight. However, by observing the declaration of her rival, country two has the possibility of inferring the type she faces at war.
We prove for UR that war is the unique Perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of the asymmetric information game. For FDR, we find that there are two classes of equilibria. The first class, Peaceful Equilibria, contains equilibria that assigns at least a positive probability to peace. In the second class, all equilibria assign probability one to war.
In the Peaceful Equilibria, there are two kinds of equilibria. In the first, the high type declares war and the low type is peaceful while country two is also peaceful.
Consequently, when country one declares war, country two infers she is fighting a high type and subsequently countries play under complete information. There are distributions of the resource for which this equilibrium exists except when the valuations of country two and the low type are low. The reason for the lack of existence is due to the ability of the low type to fake a high type when country two is very weak, because this country will be very insu ciently armed in a conflict. If the low type's valuation is high enough, one can find a distribution of the resource to sustain peace as country two would demand a very low share of the resource.
In the second class of equilibrium, every type and country choose peace. This equilibrium does not exist when all the following possibilities occur jointly:
1. There is a low probability that country one has a high valuation.
2. There is a large dispersion in the possible valuations of country one.
3. The strength and/or valuation of country two is high.
Point 1 is counterintuitive. It says peace can not be achieved when we are close to complete information! The interpretation is that the share of country one is dictated by its high valuation, but when there is a high probability that country one is weak, war looks like a good prospect for country two, especially when the likely low type has a low valuation of the resource (point 2) and country two is powerful or values the resource a lot (point 3). Note that, despite the fact that the high type is unlikely, war occurs with probability one.
We end this section by reviewing the literature. Schelling (1980) and Fearon (1995) suggested that asymmetric information is a possible cause of war. An early model of war including asymmetric information is by Brito and Intriligator (1985) . A thorough discussion of the e↵ects of incomplete information on war is in Jackson and Morelli (2011, p. 10). They conclude that "If the cost of war is low enough, then country B is better o↵ simply going to war and taking its chances rather than reaching such an unfavorable bargain." Our findings complete this intuition by showing a list of the causes of war and by highlighting the role of the initial share in the resource. In particular, our results show that relative magnitudes matter, namely the dispersion of valuations in country one and the relative strength of country two, and that a low probability that country one has a high valuation is also bad for peace.
The rest of the paper goes as follows. Section 2 spells out the model. Section 3 studies the full information case. Section 4 considers asymmetric information.
Finally, Section 5 presents our final comments.
The Model
Two countries dispute a divisible resource which they value in V 1 and V 2 , respectively. In case of war, they incur sunk expenses of g 1 and g 2 . Let p i be the probability that i obtains the resource after the war. 3 p i is determined by an asymmetric contest success function of the following form:
where i 2 (0, 1) is the productivity of country i in war e↵orts. 4 Defining ✓ ⌘ 2 / 1 as the relative productivity of country two in war, the contest success function when g 1 + g 2 > 0 can be rewritten as:
Both countries are risk-neutral. In case of war, their expected payo↵s are
The game is played as follows: In the first stage, countries decide to declare war or not. If a country declares war, we will say that this country makes the necessary preparations for war, even though a formal declaration might not be issued. The decisions at this stage are perfectly observed when the next stage begins. In the second stage, if one of the countries declared war, the conflict is waged and payo↵s are delivered. Otherwise, we have peace.
Our two-stage model of war avoids the problem arising in one-stage models where starting war is a dominant strategy. The shortcomings of our approach are that we do not allow for surprise attacks and that, once war is prepared, there is no way of achieving peace. We discuss both issues in turn.
The most famous historical surprise attacks -the attacks of Nazi Germany on Russia and Japan on the United States, both in December 1941-ended with the attackers ultimately being defeated. The surprise attack of Japan on Russia in February 1905 was more successful but produced only minimal casualties.
In these examples, the fate of war was determined by battles fought later on. 
Full Information Case
Assume that all the parameters defining the game are common knowledge between the two countries. We solve the game beginning with the second stage.
Assuming that there is war, first order conditions (henceforth FOC) of expected payo↵ maximization for each country are:
We verify in Appendix 6.1 that these conditions are su cient. Thus, war e↵orts are given by (4), which implies that
Substituting (5) into (4) and defining ⌘ V2 V1 , we obtain the full information war e↵ort, g
6 It can be argued that both historical examples did not end up in war, but by reinterpreting war e↵orts as the cost of colonization and the resulting p i 's as the shares in South America/Africa, our analysis is still applicable.
Substituting expressions (6) and (7) into (3), we obtain the equilibrium payo↵ for each country:
The payo↵s above are strictly positive. Thus, we have the following result:
Proposition 1 Under complete information, war is the unique equilibrium outcome of UR.
Let us now study FDR. Denote the pre-established distribution of the resource in the hands of country one as " 2 (0, 1). As the resource is fully distributed, the share of country two is 1 ". For peace to hold in equilibrium, the following condition should hold for the first country.
which amounts to 1
Performing a similar calculation for the second country, we obtain
Then, if peace is achieved, conditions (11) and (12) imply
Note that the right-hand side (henceforth, RHS) of identity (13) is always greater than the left-hand side (henceforth, LHS) of it. Moreover, both sides are positive and less than 1. Thus, we have proved the following:
Proposition 2 Under complete information, there is a set of divisions of the resource given by (13) , where peace is the unique equilibrium outcome of FDR.
Equation (13) The length of the set for which peace holds as an equilibrium is given by (x) = 2x
(x) ! 0 as x ! 0, or x ! 1 and it has a maximum at x = 1, i.e., when players are identical. Thus asymmetries between contestants make it harder to find a division that achieves peace as an equilibrium outcome. This is because a stronger contestant would demand a larger share when she has a large possibility of a victory in a decisive battle.
Asymmetric Information
Under asymmetric information, UR and FDR are two-stage games with observed actions and incomplete information where players (countries) simultaneously choose an action at each stage. The types correspond to di↵erent possible valuations of the resource. Let V i be the type set for country i, i = 1, 2. We assume that country one has two possible types denoted by V H and V L with
Country two has only one type denoted by V 2 . Now let us introduce the following pieces of notation
Condition (14) excludes cases in which country two is "very weak" or "very strong" in terms of valuations of the resource and is introduced mainly, for analytic convenience. Next, we introduce an assumption which guarantees that war expenses are non-negative:
The LHS of (15) is increasing in ⇢. The RHS of (15) Country two has prior beliefs that country one is of the high type with probability ⇡ 2 [0, 1], and that she is of low type with probability 1 ⇡.
In the first stage, countries choose an action a i 2 A = {P, D} where P is to stay peaceful and D is to declare war. These actions are revealed at the end of this stage. When player one is of type V H (resp. V L ), her war e↵ort is denoted
At the end of the first stage, player two updates her beliefs about the type of player one, based on the history of actions available in the first stage, denoted by h. We denote H as the set of all possible histories, i.e., H = {DD, DP, P D, P P }.
The posterior belief of player two about the type of player one is µ :
where (V 1 ) is the set of all probability distributions on V 1 . With a slight abuse of notation, we denote the posterior beliefs as (
Therefore, country two ex-post believes that country one is of the high type with probability µ 2 [0, 1], and that she is of the low type with probability 1 µ. As µ  1, from (15) it follows that
Let s = (a, g) be a strategy profile consisting of the choice of an action in the first stage and the choice of e↵ort in the second stage. For FDR, we define the following payo↵ functions for players one and two.
For UR, the payo↵s concerning h = (P, P ) are replaced by zero. Otherwise, payo↵s are identical to those in (17) and (18).
We define a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (henceforth, PBE) for UR and FDR following Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) . For the sake of simplicity, we only consider pure strategies throughout our analysis.
Definition 3 For UR and FDR, a PBE in pure strategies is a strategy profile
and posterior beliefs µ such that:
as a degenerate probability distribution over A.
and
(H) and (P) impose each continuation strategy to be a Bayesian equilibrium of the game starting with history h and beliefs corresponding to that history. (H) is the requirement concerning second-stage histories and beliefs, i.e., h, and µ, whereas (P) is the requirement concerning war declaration. (B1) states that the posterior beliefs, given the history in stage two, ought to obey the Bayes' rule whenever possible. We impose that ⇤ must be a degenerate probability distribution as we only consider pure strategies. Lastly, (B2) says that, given the signal sent by player one, the posterior beliefs of player two are independent of her action in the first stage.
Throughout this section, we consider separating and pooling equilibria. A separating (resp. pooling) equilibrium is a strategy profile in which di↵erent types of player one choose di↵erent (resp. the same) actions in the first stage.
We start by analyzing UR. Let us assume for a moment that we have war in the second stage. Then, the expected payo↵s of each player given by (17) and (18), for h 6 = (P, P ), are strictly concave. Thus FOCs guarantee a unique maximum.
For the time being, we disregard non-negativity constraints. Using the reaction functions derived in Appendix 6.3, we get the equilibrium war e↵ort of each country and each player as:
Note that g ⇤ H and g ⇤ 2 are both strictly positive and by (16) , g ⇤ L also is strictly positive. Then, substituting (19) - (21) into (17) and (18), we get the following equilibrium payo↵s for each player and type.
Note that all payo↵s above are strictly positive.
Lemma 4 There is no PBE for UR in which player two is peaceful and at least one type of player one is peaceful.
Proof. Assume first a = (P, P, P ). Now assume that a = (D, P, P ). In this profile,
. Using (B2), player two gets u ⇤ 2 if she deviates, which is larger. The proof concerning the profile a ⇤ = (P, D, P ) is identical to the one above.
Lemma 5 There is no separating equilibrium in which player two declares war.
Proof. Assume a = (D, P, D) or a = (P, D, D). Take the former profile, and assume it is part of the PBE. The consistent beliefs are µ = 1, and there is war with probability one. The payo↵ of the high type is given by substituting µ = 1 into (22), whereas the deviation payo↵ is given by substituting µ = 0 into (22).
Thus, for a high type player not to deviate:
The payo↵ of the low type implied by the profile is given by substituting µ = 0 into (23), whereas the deviation payo↵ is given by substituting µ = 1 into (23).
Therefore, for a low type player not to deviate:
which contradicts (25). The proof concerning a = (P, D, D) is identical.
Proposition 6
War is the unique PBE outcome of UR.
Proof. By lemmata 4 and 5, there is not any peaceful PBE. Thus, if we conclude that at least one of the two remaining profiles, (D,
is an equilibrium, we prove the proposition.
Now assume that a = (D, D, P ). War occurs. By (B2), player two is indi↵erent between the two actions, whereas if any type deviates, players achieve the zero payo↵ outcome. As war always pays o↵ a positive expected amount, no type will have any incentive to deviate.
Proposition 6 says that the results obtained in UR under asymmetric information parallel the ones from UR under complete information. Specifically, peace is impossible in this setting under complete or asymmetric information.
We now study FDR under asymmetric information. First, we show that there is a unique separating equilibrium. In particular, by lemmata 7 and 8 below, we first eliminate some of the candidate equilibrium profiles. Then, in proposition 9, we confirm that the only remaining strategy profile is a PBE.
Lemma 7
There is no separating equilibrium for FDR in which player two declares war. Lemma 8 There is no separating equilibrium for FDR under asymmetric information in which the high type is peaceful, and the low type declares war when player two is peaceful.
Proof. a = (P, D, P ). The consistent beliefs imply µ = 0. Substituting µ = 0 into equations (22) and (23), we find the equilibrium payo↵s of war for the high type and the low type, respectively, as follows:
For this profile to be an equilibrium, the high type should be better o↵ under peace:
Moreover, the low type has to be better o↵ declaring war
which constitutes a clear contradiction.
Proposition 9
There is a unique separating equilibrium of FDR in which country 2 and the low type are peaceful as the high type declares war if and only if:
Proof. Assume a = (D, P, P ) and condition (15) is satisfied. The consistent beliefs imply µ = 1. Then, condition (H) implies the following ex-post payo↵s for the high type and player two, respectively:
If player one is a low type, peace is obtained with the following ex-post payo↵s.
For a to be a part of the PBE, a high type ought to choose peace:
Also, a low type player ought not to deviate to declaring war. Given a, player two will act as if she were facing a high type. Substituting µ = 1 into (23), we get:
The condition for the low type player is
Finally, player two should not deviate. The expected payo↵ of player two is:
whereas the deviation payo↵ given the belief µ = 1 is:
Hence, the condition for player two is u 2 u D 2 , implying:
Combining (28)-(30), the condition for a being a part of the PBE is:
Note that the LHS of the condition above is less than the second term in the RHS of it. Hence, we drop the condition concerning the high type, implying that the su cient condition for the existence of the equilibrium is given by (27). By lemmata 7 and 8, there is no other separating equilibrium. Combining conditions (28)-(30), we get the result. Now we look for pooling equilibria. As mentioned before, in a pooling equilibrium, both types of player one either declare war or stay peaceful.
Proposition 10 For FDR, given beliefs µ (V H |h) = ⇡ where h 2 {(D, .) , (P, .)} and g satisfies (H);
is a part of the pooling equilibrium if o↵-the-path beliefs
(ii) a = (P, P, D) is a part of the pooling equilibrium if o↵-the-path beliefs
(iv) a = (P, P, P ) is a part of the pooling equilibrium if o↵-the-path beliefs
Proof.
(i) For (D, D, D), deviation payo↵s for each type are given by (22) and (23) for µ = µ o . Then, condition (P) implies that o↵-the-equilibrium beliefs have to obey:
, for the high and the low type, respectively. Simplifying the inequalities above, we see that they hold i↵ (⇡ µ o ) p ⇢ x 0, which is condition (31).
(ii) For (P, P, D), the first two conditions are equivalent to the conditions for part (i). Given µ o = ⇡ by (B2), for player two not to deviate to peace, u ⇤ 2
(1 ") V 2 , implying the condition. 
Therefore, the binding condition is for the low type. By (B2), player two is indi↵erent between her two actions.
(iv) If (P, P, P ) is a part of the PBE, u
Thus, the binding condition is for the high type. By (B2), if player two declares war, she has the same beliefs; i.e., µ o = ⇡. Thus,
We now focus on two equilibria in which peace is the possible outcome: The separating equilibrium in Proposition 9, where only the high type declares war, and the pooling equilibrium in Proposition 10 part (iv ), in which all types and all players are peaceful.
First, we consider the pooling equilibrium. Note that the pooling equilibrium implies probability one for peace. Therefore, we choose to name this equilibrium Definitely Peaceful Equilibrium (DPE). This equilibrium holds if (34) is satisfied.
We assume that o↵-the-equilibrium path beliefs are the prior beliefs; i.e.,
Other assumptions about those beliefs are possible, but we focus on this case for the sake of simplicity. Thus, the two conditions of (34) boil down to:
Rearranging (35), we reach the following condition for peace to hold in equilibrium:
The RHS of (36) will be denoted as F (⇡, ⇢). We have two cases: (36) is non positive. Therefore, there is a distribution of the resource that achieves peace. This case arises if ⇢ is very close to one (so both types have similar valuations) or when ⇡ is very close to one, so the probability of a high type is overwhelming. In both cases, the uncertainty is small. Note that this case is compatible with our assumption in (36) is positive and things are more involved.
Firstly, note that this case is compatible with (15) i↵
which implies that 1 ⇡ + x + 2⇡x; i.e., ⇡, and x cannot be very large at the same time. Now, let us discuss the role of each parameter separately.
The role of x is clear. When the strength of country two or her valuation is low, peace holds because this country could only demand a small share and this is always feasible.
To find the role of ⇡, we partially di↵erentiate the right-hand side of (36) with respect to ⇡ and find the following expression:
It is easy to see that
with ⇡ and we conclude that a large value of ⇡ gives peace a good chance. This is very intuitive because uncertainty is very small. However, a su ciently low value of ⇡ makes war very likely. Indeed, when ⇡ ' 0, the condition for war is
In order to show that (38) is compatible with our assumptions, we provide an example. Let x = 2/5 (e.g., ✓ = 1 and = 2/5), and ⇢ = 1/9, so 1 > > ⇢. By (15) , the low type puts a positive e↵ort in war. However, we will have war at
Note that the LHS of (38) is increasing in ⇢, so in this case, war arises as a combination of a low probability of country one being of the high type, a large valuation and/or strength of country two and a small valuation for the low type country one. In all these cases, the share inducing the high type to be peaceful looks too expensive for country two, which has a good chance of winning a sizable chunk of the prize by going to war.
It is remarkable that despite the fact that when ⇡ = 0, war cannot happen in FDR (see Proposition 2), war is perfectly possible when ⇡ is very close to zero.
Even more, war is more likely the closer the value of ⇡ is to zero. This reveals an interesting discontinuity in the prevention of war.
Finally, it is easily seen that
is close to 0 and peace has a fair chance. This is because we are close to complete information. However, if ⇢ is low, F (⇡, ·) could be large and make peace impossible. This is because the low type will make very little e↵ort in war and will lose it with a high probability, but its share in the resource is determined by the high type, so war looks like a good prospect for country two.
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Summing up, from the discussion above, we learn that the failure of the existence of DPE for FDR is due to:
1. Large relative strength and/or valuation of country two.
2. Low probability that country one has a high valuation.
3. Large dispersion in the possible valuations of country one.
The mechanism under which war occurs is that country one appears, in expected terms, as a weak opponent in war, but peace can only be avoided when the share of this country is given by the characteristics of the high type.
Now we consider the separating equilibrium in Proposition 9. Realize that in this equilibrium, war takes place with probability ⇡. Hence we call this equilibrium Possibly Peaceful Equilibrium (PPE). The relevant condition for the existence of this equilibrium is given by:
In Appendix 6.4, we show that the inequality (39) holds when ⇢ and x are not very small. For example, for ⇢ = 0.01, = 0.02 and ✓ = 1, (39) fails to hold.
The explanation is that when x is very small, the e↵ort of player two is biased
to small values when she observes a declaration at the beginning of the second stage. However, ex-ante, because of the probability of a very weak opponent, she still demands some considerable share of the resource. Thus, if the low type deviates and declares war, she can benefit from the beliefs of player two, who believes that she fights a powerful rival.
We also show in Appendix 6.4 that if x is large, implying that player two is strong, an increase in ⇢ makes the possible partitions of the resource that sustain PPE larger. This result partially parallels the results obtained under complete information. Realize that in PPE, the peaceful players are both the low type and player two. Thus if their strength/valuation are similar, the possible partitions that satisfy both parties is a large set, given that the partition does not satisfy the high type. However, when x is small, an increase in ⇢ makes the possible partitions that allow for PPE to be smaller, as when country two is very weak and there is not much di↵erence between a high and a low type, the corresponding partitions are a small set. Note, however, that there are possible partitions supporting PPE, when country two is very weak, because she only demands a small amount of resources, unlike the case where ⇢ and x are both low.
Note that if " 1/ (1 + x) 2 , PPE fails to exist, as the high type would be rich to risk a war. Combined with ⇡ being su ciently low, DPE also fails to exist, implying that in the remaining equilibria war occurs.
Final Comments
In this paper, we studied the role of information and resource ownership in conflicts. In order to conform with our initial motivation we only mentioned warfare throughout the paper. However, we can also apply our model to litigation. An example is divorce proceedings in which a previous partition of the resource, e.g. total wealth of the couple and full/partial custody rights, may or may not exist. This situation would be a straightforward application of FDR and UR.
We now summarize our results. In the benchmark case of complete information, when the resource is not distributed, war always occurs. When the resource is distributed, war is a consequence of the interplay between asymmetries of contestants (embedded in x) and the distribution of ownership ("). When the latter does not reflect the former adequately, war occurs. The good news is that war can always be stopped by the appropriate distribution of resources. These conclusions agree with some theories about wars in 17 th century Europe when the Spanish empire was militarily weak but owned large territories and France was militarily powerful and contended part of the territories owned by Spain (a similar case occurred in the 20 th century with the British Empire and Germany as players). Our theory, contrary to some theories of war, stresses the role of relative asymmetries; it is not the size of the prize that triggers war but the relative distribution of it in relationship to the relative strength of the armies.
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Under asymmetric information, when the resource is not distributed, the outcome is always war. Thus, asymmetric information does not alter the picture when there is no prior ownership. However, when the resource is distributed, informational asymmetries make a di↵erence regarding war or peace. We dis-tinguish between war in a pooling equilibrium, in which both types declare war, and war in a separating equilibrium, in which only the high type declares war.
In a pooling equilibrium, if the uninformed country assigns a low probability that the informed country has a high type, war always occurs. This is noteworthy because it shows that a little asymmetric information may cause war.
Apparently inexplicable facts like the Nazi invasion of the USSR might be explained by this mechanism. A weak USSR owned "too much land" with respect In order to make the model tractable, we have made a number of assumptions and left aside some questions that we discuss now. 2. Another extension would be to consider a political bias as in Jackson and Morelli (2007) . In this paper, the agent running a country might receive high profits from the victory but pay only a fraction of the cost of war. In this case, if the bias is su ciently large, peace cannot hold.
3. Finally, bargaining for the distribution of the resource usually takes several rounds. It would be interesting to model the distributions of the resource that could be achieved by bargaining as in the model of Rubinstein (1982) .
We hope that our paper sheds light on the powers and limitations of achieving peace by means of the distribution of resources and pinpoints the cases in which achieving peace by this means is bound to fail and other measures like direct UN intervention have to be taken.
Appendix

Existence of SPNE with Generalized Tullock CSF
Assume the CSF is given as follows:
Then, the payo↵ functions of war for each player are:
The FOCs of the payo↵ maximization are:
Solving system (42), we obtain:
These e↵orts are not necessarily an NE, because the Second Order Condition (SOC) of payo↵ maximization might not hold, so an extra argument is necessary. Consider player one. Her payo↵ function with g 2 = g ⇤ 2 is continuous, so there is a maximum of this function over the interval [0, V 1 ]. Even though the maximization on the definition of an NE is on the real line, in equilibrium, no rational player will spend more on war than her valuation. Thus, the aforementioned maximum can be either located at the extremes, i.e. g The same argument applies for player two. Letting V 2 = V 1 , we need: Some remarks are in order. First, in the NE constructed above,
Thus, as it happens when s  1, war productivity does not a↵ect the ratio of equilibrium expenses.
Second, if (45) does not hold for at least one player, the second stage of UR will fail to have an NE in pure strategies. Even though there is an equilibrium in mixed strategies, given the di culty of interpreting mixed strategies in our framework, we do not pursue this matter.
Finally, using (45), we can show that the conditions for peace to hold in equilibrium are
The conditions above boil down to the following set of divisions admitting peace.
which for s = 1 are identical to (13).
Resource Constraints under Complete Information
Assume players one and two, respectively, own resources R 1 = R and R 2 = aR to be used in war, exclusively, where a 0 is the relative amount of resources of player two. Assume R g 1 , aR g 2 , so no player can spend more than she
initially owns. We now analyze both UR and FDR under this new assumption.
If player i is constrained, the marginal utility of e↵ort is greater than the marginal cost of it at g i = R i . Formally
If (47) holds, the equilibrium e↵ort of player i is g
Given the concavity of the payo↵ function, this condition is necessary and su cient.
First, consider UR. There are four cases. In the first one, no player is resourceconstrained, which is the case we analyzed in the main text. In the second one, both players are resource-constrained, which implies equilibrium e↵orts are 
For peace to hold, the LHS of (50) has to be less than 1 and the RHS of (50) has to be greater than 0, as " 2 (0, 1). These conditions are implied by (48).
Clearly, the RHS of (50) has to be larger than the LHS of it. Suppose on the contrary that
which is impossible. Thus, there is an " such that (50) holds and peace is the only equilibrium outcome. Now assume that only one player, say player one, is constrained. Thus, g ⇤ 1 = R 1 . The best reply of player two is
For peace to hold, the distribution of the resource " 2 (0, 1) should satisfy:
Using simple algebra, we reduce (53) to the following.
The LHS (54) has to be less than 1. Assume otherwise. Note at g ⇤ 1 and g ⇤ 2 (47) reads:
However, the LHS being larger than 1 contradicts the condition above. The necessity of the RHS to be larger than 0 is implied again by condition (47).
The last condition is the non-emptiness of the set defined by (54). Suppose this interval is empty. Then:
whereas by the FOC of payo↵ maximization of player one, we obtain that
which together with (55) implies a contradiction. Thus, there is always a division of the resource such that peace is the unique equilibrium outcome. The case when country 2 is constrained and country 1 is not is equivalent. Summing up, proposition 2 can be generalized to include resource constraints.
Equilibrium in FDR with asymmetric information
Neglecting the non-negativity constraints, the FOCs of (17) for a high and a low type are, respectively:
Using the expressions above, we get the following best response functions for the high and the low type, respectively, as:
The FOC of (18) for country two is:
Equilibrium war e↵orts (19) - (21) 
The RHS of (63) is less than one for x > 1, so if ⇢ is su ciently close to one, ◆ As x ! 0, the expression in brackets is negative, so @G @⇢ < 0. Therefore, when the uninformed country is very weak, an increase in ⇢ makes the interval smaller, given ⇡.
